+- Forum Rockoldies (https://rockoldies.net/forum)
+-- Forum: E BOOKS - AUDIOBOOKS (https://rockoldies.net/forum/forumdisplay.php?fid=9)
+--- Forum: novels, non-fiction and newspapers english (https://rockoldies.net/forum/forumdisplay.php?fid=11)
+---- Forum: Literature (https://rockoldies.net/forum/forumdisplay.php?fid=31)
+---- Thema: Vladimir Todoric, Leon Malazogu - Belgrade - Prishtina Dialogue (/showthread.php?tid=89139)
Vladimir Todoric, Leon Malazogu - Belgrade - Prishtina Dialogue - Panter - 27.10.2024
![[Bild: 7ec51433c00c06e87dd8741ef28ef08a.jpg]](https://i124.fastpic.org/big/2024/0927/8a/7ec51433c00c06e87dd8741ef28ef08a.jpg)
Vladimir Todoric, Leon Malazogu - Belgrade - Prishtina Dialogue: Transformation of Self-Interest Required
English | 2011 | 39 pages | PDF | 574 KB
While Kosovo and Serbia had talks many times in the past, this is the first time that they agree on something directly (five agreements have already been reached). Despite the flaws and dissatisfaction, if it bears to fruition, these first agreements will make this process historic. Whether the talks yield lasting results, will depend on the final mile and whether both sides can claim to have served their self-interest and cooperated with each other at the same time.
The process descended from practical talks to a trade row and to an open dispute. Each side still believes that its gain can only come at the loss of the other. The national interest is short-sightedly defined as undermining of the other side's national interest. The goal of this analysis by the New Policy Center (NPC) from Belgrade and the Project on Ethnic Relations Kosovo (PER-K) from Prishtina is to prove that both countries must realize their interest in helping each other to become functional. Although highly unpopular, we believe that the two sides are in the same boat (of shared problems), but are yet to realize this.
Dialogue is usually about seizing the right moment. Time is never fully ripe and the moment is usually about capturing a narrow window of opportunity. The window that brought Serbia and Kosovo closer together is fast shutting, under a range of looming risk factors lined up in the horizon that may harm rapprochement: (a) the possibility that Serbia organizes elections in the north, (b) EU's lack of unity, © lack of implementation of the current agreement and the non-inclusion of more items (regional cooperation, telecommunications, energy, integrated border/boundary management), (d) lowering of bilateral conditionality, or (e) if the EU carrots are seen as rewarding the sides asymmetrically to their performance.
The Dialogue has all the hallmarks of a beauty contest. Negotiators do not genuinely engage in dialogue but appeal to EU sympathies and respond to pressure. Kosovo and Serbia publicly present as if they are continuing century-old battles but this time with diplomatic finesse. Inside and outside the negotiation room the talks resemble a beauty contest, attempting to influence the external mediator's assessment that has been more 'constructive'. Populist tendencies portray the dialogue as a victorious feat of out-smarting the other side, which may improve the standing of individual politicians, but will harm their credibility and make it more difficult to agree in subsequent rounds. It is important not to lose momentum - despite the setbacks, it is after all better to have insincere cooperation than sincere conflict.
It was important to examine the gains and losses for the main stakeholders in detail. Currently on paper, the calculated gains are higher than the losses. This Dialogue has induced Kosovo and Serbia to say the right things, appear pro dialogue, but Serbia and Kosovo still perceive that it is in their self-interest to see each other as weak as possible. For as long as Serbia is perceived as a threat to Kosovo and vice versa, the two sides will see their strengthening only in respect to the weakness of 'the enemy'. Such a view will not only expend valuable resources inefficiently, but will also prevent the reforms and transformation of societies towards European values.
Serbia will not be granted a EU candidate status unless its starts dismantling some of the 'parallel institutions' in the north of Kosovo and to normalize relations with Kosovo. If these conditions are met, the two countries can unlock their European future. If 'normalization' is accomplished in the last weeks before Dec 9th, Serbia may be granted candidacy while Kosovo may be granted visa liberalization and contractual relations with the EU. Kosovo has nothing to gain if Serbia is stopped in its European integration, but stands to lose if Serbia loses interest to deliver on 'normalization'. Unfortunately, normalization does not come by itself but it depends on strong conditionality by member states.
Asymmetric progress can threaten both countries, for the 'same boat' concept would cease to apply. It is essential that through external policy the EU deepens the understanding that the two sides are in the same boat; hence digging holes for the other side will sink both. For this message to be effective, EU assessments must be consistent.
The closed nature of the process has produced minimum consensus-building and a "bunker-mentality" with resistance to implement the agreements that were closed. The current dialogue should address relations between Prishtina and Belgrade, while Prishtina should open up a channel of communication with northern Kosovo Serbs.
4fe04e17822b9eb6c604d4e9798b3836
Download from RapidGator